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Abstract— Protection of the national infrastructure is a high 
priority for cybersecurity of the homeland. Critical infrastructure 
such as the national power grid, commercial financial networks, 
and communications networks have been successfully invaded and 
re-invaded from foreign and domestic attackers. The ability to re-
establish authentication and confidentiality of the network 
participants via secure channels that have not been compromised 
would be an important countermeasure to compromise of our 
critical network infrastructure. This paper describes a concept of 
operations by which the NASA Tracking and Data Relay (TDRS) 
constellation of spacecraft in conjunction with the White Sands 
Complex (WSC) Ground Station host a security recovery system 
for re-establishing secure network communications in the event of 
a national or regional cyberattack.  Users would perform security 
and network restoral functions via a Broadcast Satellite Service 
(BSS) from the TDRS constellation. The BSS enrollment only 
requires that each network location have a receive antenna and 
satellite receiver. This would be no more complex than setting up 
a “DIRECTTV™-like” receiver at each network location with 
separate network connectivity. A GEO BSS would allow a mass re-
enrollment of network nodes (up to nationwide) simultaneously 
depending upon downlink characteristics. This paper details the 
spectrum requirements, link budget, notional assets and 
communications requirements for the scheme. It describes the 
architecture of such a system and the manner in which it leverages 
off of the existing secure infrastructure which is already in place 
and managed by the NASA/GSFC Space Network Project. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Current experiences with cyberattacks occurring during 
peacetime strongly indicate that future warfare will be conducted 
via network attacks on US infrastructure. It is possible that a 
continuous state of cyberwarfare exists now and will continue to 
exist into the foreseeable future. Nation-states can be attacked 
by other nation-states as well as rogue actors, terrorist 
organizations or organized crime organizations. Attackers may 
have individuals in place ready to facilitate actions to disrupt and 
interdict networks, both public and private. Additionally, 
security vulnerabilities in the network infrastructure such as 
zero-day exploits, improperly installed or non-functional 
network security features, and social engineering attacks all 
increase the likelihood that attackers can and will damage the 
national cyber-infrastructre in an initial attack. It is necessary to 
have multiple strategies to recover from the initial attack and 
then re-establish secure network communications. Such a 
recovery may require that networks flush out existing data such 
as access control lists, X.509 certificates, PKI information and 
sensitive metadata and then re-establish themselves with 
uncompromised data. In the case of Windows Server Active 
Directory users, they may need to do some form of Active 
Directory restoral. In this paper, we will describe the Space 
Network infrastructure, layout a strategy for establishing a 
security recovery system within the confines of the Space 
Network, a concept of operations for re-establishing network 
security, and modeling results that support the concept of 
operations. Examples of institutions that the security recovery 
concept would be applicable to include: 
 Institutions without an archive of critical security 
restoral information 
 Institutions whose archives may be at risk of being 
compromised (e.g. public Cloud-based archives) 
 Remote locations without secure access to the archive 
(e.g. remote power grid stations and facilities 
 
For example, Windows Server Active Directory (AD) 
Certificate Services System State Backup and Restore could be 
fed via the Space Network. Setting up or restoring Domain 
Controllers using a certified copy of the AD database that has 
not passed the tombstone date could be accomplished and users 
would be required to periodically refresh the archived backups 
and any tools needed to accomplish restoral. Bare metal restoral 
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would not be recommended under this concept due to the 
required data volume (8-12Gbytes [1]) 
II. TDRS AND THE SPACE NETWORK (SN) 
A. TDRS Relay Constellation 
NASA operates a constellation of relay satellites in 
geosynchronous orbit to provide continuous coverage for low 
earth orbiting (LEO) satellites. TDRS constellation allows for a 
wide variety of spacecraft, balloons, sub-orbital and other 
vehicles to communicate to the ground regardless of whether or 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. NASA Space Network servicing NASA customers 
not the vehicle is over a ground station [2]. All of the vehicle 
data is returned via Ku-band link to the White Sands Complex 
(WSC) in Las Cruces, NM.  WSC is a secure facility that resides 
on the White Sands Missile Range. The TDRS spacecraft are 
operated from WSC. NASA user data that is relayed from user 
spacecrafts to WSC is transmitted over a closed network to the 
user mission operation centers. The TDRS relay satellites and 
the ground stations constitute the NASA Space Network. Figure 
1 depicts the basic constellation architecture. Missions such as 
the International Space Station, Hubble Space Telescope and the 
Swift Observatory relay data through the SN. In the case of ISS, 
the links include the data for the hosted payloads, astronaut 
communications and ISS-related telemetry. Fig. 2 displays the 
main communications systems of one generation of TDRS 
spacecraft. 
B. Key Attributes of the Space Network that allow for non-
space applications  
Although the TDRS was designed as a relay spacecraft, it 
can be used in applications other than a space relay. In this paper, 
two of the attributes that allow this utilization will be discussed. 
TDRS services are specified as either forward or return services. 
A forward service originates on the ground from the user mission 
operations center and a return service originates from the user 
platform as shown in Fig. 3. Two important attributes are:  
 S-band spread spectrum, MA forward service 
capability. This CDMA capability provides reduced 
interference for multiple users communicating 
simultaneously over S-band 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Second Generation TDRS spacecraft 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.Multiple Access (MA) Forward and Return service definition 
 
 The MA forward service links will close at zero altitude 
and are possible throughout the CONUS. The forward 
link is limited to 300 kbps for spread spectrum 
operation. 
III. CONCEPT OF OPERATION 
A. System Elements 
Designated Sites. Designated Sites are locations that have 
been selected for emergency restart via a TDRS MA forward 
service. The necessary credientials and data are received over a 
space link from one or more TDRS spacecraft in view at the 
time of the emergency. The Designated Sites send their archival 
information periodically to Emergency Control Center for 
storage. 
Emergency Control Center. The Emergency Control Center 
(ECC) resides at a physically secure location at WSC. The ECC 
maintains the users key information such as Certificate 
Authority data from the System State Backup needed to re-start 
secure network operations at designated sites. It may also 
contain other key operational data required by each designated 
site. From the SN perspective, the Emergency Control Center 
plays the role of the User MOC in Fig. 3. 
 
 
 
 Emergency Ground Station. This is the satellite ground 
antenna and receiver at each designated site. It could be a 
mobile or fixed site. The requirements for the  Emergency 
Ground Station can be satisfied  with Commercial-Off the Shelf 
equipment and a S-band receive antenna with 0.5m aperture 
size. There is no return service (no uplink) from the  Emergency 
Ground Station and each site will be provided the coordinates 
for pointing the antenna. There are no tracking requirements. 
Given the wide variety of secure network configurations and 
data required, no standard implementation would be imposed 
upon the designated sites, except that they are recommneded to 
have an  “air-gapped” satellite receiver and computer system for 
receipt of the TDRS forward link security data. Air-gapped” is 
defined as no network or physical link between the computer 
sysem downloading information from TDRS and any other 
computer networks. The TDRS link is a one-way half-duplex 
link. The  Emergency Ground Station plays the role of the user 
platform each with a unique CDMA code. 
Restoral Message Virtual Private Network. This is a 
dedicated, demonstrably secure, encrypted network of one-way 
network traffic from  Emergency Ground Stations and the 
Emergency Control Center. The only traffic permitted  on this 
network are Emergency Ground Station status messages and 
ack/nack messages confirming/denying successful data 
reception from the  Emergency Ground Station to the 
Emergency Control Center over the TDRS MA forward service. 
Traffic between  Emergency Ground Stations and any other 
network noded should be prohibited (or highly restricted) 
B. Basic Concept of Operations 
 A cyberattack on elements of the national infrastructure 
occurs and the network infrastructure is taken off-line. 
 The Designated Sites start-up the  Emergency Ground 
Stations and sends an encrypted message indicating on-
line status 
 Upon receipt of proper authorization, the Emergency 
Control Center creates a MA forward message queue 
for transmission of restoral basis data to all the 
designated sites and notifies the SN. 
 Using a new service concept called MA Fast Forward, 
the SN schedules one or more TDRS spacecraft for MA 
forward and transmits the restoral information to each 
Emergency Ground Station. The SN will operate single 
forward links via the appropriate TDRS spacecraft(s) to 
Emergency Ground Stations until the MA forward 
message queue is empty. 
 Using the VPN, the Emergency Ground Stations, 
acknowledge receipt of restoral data back to the 
Emergency Control Center. If no acknowledgement is 
received, another MA forward service is scheduled 
with the SN at the next opportunity.  
 The downloaded data from the MA forward link now 
residing at the Emergency Ground Station is physically 
moved to the computer network requiring restoral.  
It is anticipated that the volume of critical data to be 
downloaded would be on the order of 500 Mbytes per user as 
packetized files. Users could utilize successive downloading 
events to retrieve their files, if necessary. 
C. TDRS Multiple Access Fast Forward (MAFF) 
The current TDRS MA system requires a modification to 
permit the rapid fulfillment of forward services to multiple 
users. This is because the system was designed to handle 
multiple return users, (typically science data from multiple 
spacecraft), but only individual forward service users (typically 
commands from the MOC to the user spacecraft and 
instruments). This asymmetric service model can be modified 
to permit a rapid succession of forward services to multiple 
users. This design modification is called MA Fast Forward [3]. 
MA Fast Forward provides the following additional 
capabilities: 
 Provides new SN Operational capability which 
enhances  the MA forward (MAF) service by removing 
the need of user scheduling 
 Enables rapid access to MAF service by the user 
(science & emergency events etc.) 
 Enables reduction in SN & Customer operational 
constraints   
 Improves the SN network service utilization (rapid 
utilization of unused times) 
 Provides a potential reduction in MAF inter-service 
time. 
The service will utilize TDRS Unscheduled Time (TUT) 
and thus does not interfere with any scheduled MAF users. All 
other TDRS services (Single Access Forward and Return, and 
Multiple Access Return) are not affected. 
This concept allows for an efficient utilization of an existing 
space communications asset without impacting other users. If 
insufficient TUT exists for a given situation, then NASA 
science users could be bumped down in the priority list in favor 
of providing scheduled services. The implementation of a MA 
Fast Forward service for a homeland security network recovery 
is depicted in Fig. 4. Operators are provided to manage the 
network and data, and provide a human-in-the-loop to resolve 
problems in real time. Note that all network connections are 
one-way. The Emergency Ground Stations transfer one-way 
status and acknowledgement data to the Emergency Control 
Center. Operators at the Emergency Control Center use that 
information to plan MAF services to transmit restoral data to 
the Designated Sites via the Emergency Ground Stations. It is 
the responsibility of the Designated Sites to get the data to 
restoral points within their networks. 
D.  IT Cybersecurity Threat/Recovery Scenario 
A bad actor has identified your operations as a target of 
interest. The bad actor has worked with sympathetic and 
opportunistic actors to slowly unroll a spear-phishing campaign 
against your organization. Unaware employees and system 
users slowly provide the bad actor the information they need not 
only to compromise your operational system but also, over 
time, poison the integrity of your backup system. As a response 
to halt the attack is quickly devised it becomes clear that the 
integrity of critical assets on your system have been 
compromised and will need to be restored as quickly as 
possible. 
While the online backups are deemed unusable for recovery 
and the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of your 
network remains unknown, your team begins the work to isolate 
and restore critical parts of the infrastructure. While a full 
restore from connected backups is not possible and off-site 
storage will take some time to provide safe restore media, the 
critical infrastructure of keys, seeds, and other core information 
deemed essential to your organization is remotely stored on the 
isolated Emergency Control Center systems at the White Sands 
Complex. A transmission of this critical information to your 
organization’s air-gapped, secure, ground station at both your 
primary site and your backup site is scheduled across one or 
more upcoming TUT periods. Rapidly, your organization has 
fundamental information needed to begin a rebuild of your 
system without relying on your compromised network and IT 
infrastructure. 
E. Emergency Ground Station Requirements 
The Emergency Ground Station requires an antenna and 
receiver system capable of closing the link with the TDRS MA 
forward service. This service has link characteristics as shown 
in table 1. [4] 
TABLE I.  TDRS MA FORWARD LINK REQUIREMENTS 
Feature Value 
Customer service 
links/satellite  
1 
Frequency 2106.4 MHz 
Polarization Left Hand, Circular 
RF Channel BW (3 
dB, minimum) 
6 MHz 
Max Data Rate 300 kbps 
Modulation 
Spread Spectrum Unbalanced Quadriphase Shift 
Keying (SS-UQPSK). Spread Spectrum Binary 
Phase Shift Keying (SS-BPSK).  
 
Using the assumptions shown in table 2, the required link 
characteristics can be satisfied with a link budget as shown in 
table 3. All link characteristics and budgets were calculated by 
the NASA/GSFC RF Analysis Group utilizing their standard 
tools for analyzing all missions that could utilize TDRS 
services. 
TABLE II.  TDRS MA FORWARD LINK ASSUMPTIONS 
Ground Terminal Altitude  0 km 
Minimum Ground Terminal 
Elevation Angle 
 5° 
Frequency  2106.40625 MHz 
TDRS MA EIRP  34 dBW (1st Gen. TDRS) 
MA Information Rate  262.5 kbps 
MA Symbol Rate  300 ksps 
Modulation  SS-BPSK 
Antenna Gain  18.25 dBi (Assumed for a 0.5 
meter dish with 55% 
efficiency) 
Pointing Loss  0.5 dB (Assumed) 
Passive Loss  1 dB (Assumed) 
LNA Noise Temperature  100 ˚K (Assumed) 
System Temperature  199.4 ˚K Referenced at LNA 
(Assumed Tant =  50˚K) 
Polarization  LHCP 
Polarization Loss  0.1 dB (Assumed) 
Data Format  NRZ-L 
Command Coding  Rate 7/8 LDPC 
Command Req. Eb/N0   3.85 dB (BER=10-5) 
User Implementation Loss 3 dB 
Propagation Effects 0.5 dB (Assumed; rain and 
atmospheric attenuation) 
 
Given the assumptions above for range of 41,130.9 km and 
a coded symbol rate of 300 ksps (kilosymbols per second) 
which provides an information rate of 262.5kbps, the link 
budget shown in table 3 applies using a 0.5 meter aperture 
antenna. 
Table III. TDRS MA Forward Link Budget 
 Parameter Value Tol Remarks 
1 Relay  Network EIRP-dBw 34 -  
2 Free  Space Loss-dB 191.2 - Note B 
3 Polarization  Loss-dB 0.1 0.01 Note A  
4 Propagation  Loss-dB 0.5 * Note A  
5 Rfi  Loss-dB * - Note B  
6 Dynamics  Loss-dB * * Note B  
7 User  G/T-dB/K -6.25 - Note A  
8 Boltzman  Constant -228.6 - Note B  
9 User  Received-P/N0-dB-Hz 64.55 - 
Sum 1 
Thru 8 
     
10 Carrier/Total  Power Ratio-dB 0 - Note A 
11 
User  Required Acquisition-
P/N0-dB-HZ 61.04 3 Note A 
12 User  Acquisition Margin-dB 3.51 - 9+10-11  
13 
Command/Total  Power Ratio-
dB 0 - Note A 
14 User  Implementation Loss-dB 3 1 Note A 
15 Received  Command-P/N0-dB 61.55 - 9+13-14 
16 Command  Data Rate-dB-Hz 54.19 - Note A 
17 User  Received Eb/N0-dB 7.36 - 15-16  
18 User  Required Eb/N0-dB 3.85 1 Note A 
19 
Effective  User Command 
Margin-dB 3.51  17-18 
 
NOTE A:  PARAMETER VALUE FROM USER PROJECT-SUBJECT TO 
CHANGE.   
NOTE B:  FROM CLASS ANALYSIS IF COMPUTED 
 
The link budget was computed with NASA/GSFC CLASS 
link analysis tool assuming Low Density Parity Check (LDPC) 
Rate 7/8 forward error correction coding [5]. This link can be 
satisfied with positive margin using commercial off the shelf 
equipment and a 0.5 meter satellite dish. This can be 
accommodated in a variety of fixed and mobile ground station 
configurations. 
IV. NETWORK SIMULATION RESULTS AND DATA DELIVERY 
CAPABILITY 
A. Definition of an Event  
Data is downloaded to a site during an event. An event 
consists of the user acquiring the TDRS MA forward signal and 
receiving the downloaded data in packet form. 
B. Simulation Approach 
The RF analysis group undertook a series of simulations to 
analyze the performance of MAFF for spacecraft users. These 
results are directly applicable to the ground based security 
restoral scenario. The ground based scenario is a simplified 
subset of a space-based scenario. The ground elements are at 
fixed locations, and from the TDRS perspective, the view is 
much more constant than for low earth orbiting satellites.  
For the purposes of this paper, the simulation configuration 
for up to 32 ground-based Designated Sites receiving MAFF is 
shown in fig. 5. Two TDRS spacecraft in the east and two 
TDRS spacecraft in the west covering the 32 sites in the 
CONUS enclosed in the polygons. The simulation uses TDRS 
Unused Time (TUT) for a period of 7 days. Events are queued 
up and run to completion (i.e. all users with data in the queue 
are serviced, however long that takes). In the simulation, all four 
TDRS unused time are used to maximize the available time for 
the MAFF service.  The average delay is the time to complete 
an event (5 min, 15 min etc.) as shown in table IV. “Av” is the 
average delay considering all users, “Max” maximum value  of 
average delay  for  the selected user set,  “-“ indicates average 
delay > 10 hrs. Average delay vs. number of users takes into 
account all four TDRS (in seconds). Data buffer length and 
time-to-live are parameters that can be adjusted according to 
needs; for the current simulation, these two have been adjusted 
to ensure there is no data loss. Table IV summarize the results, 
which are for the worst case service (lowest priority events, 
unscheduled service, simple FIFO queuing), for up to 8 users. 
Simulations for up to 32 simultaneous users have been 
performed. 
Table IV. Average event delay (seconds) vs. number of simultaneous users 
 Number of Users 
User events/day 1 4 8 
Event duration Av Av Max Av Max 
5 min 
10 389 335 454 255 646 
15 385 402 472 260 598 
20 324 389 457 376 698 
15 min 
10 461 567 766 454 1311 
15 594 846 966 553 884 
20 507 1188 1297 1105 2373 
30 min 
10 815 1640 2201 1226 2899 
15 1380 3974 4461 2975 4320 
20 1639 9024 13140 12321 35668 
45 min 
10 1548 4437 5692 3348 4363 
15 2901 29521 56826 31093 69551 
20 5197 - - - - 
 
C. Performance Optimization 
In an actual emergency, the number of users requiring this 
service is likely to vary as well as the required number of user 
events/day, event duration. This problem will require 
development of utilization of optimization algorithms. The 
MAFF model utilizes historical knowledge of the TDRS 
Unused Time (TUT) which exists between scheduled user 
supports. Therefore, one model of performance optimization 
that can be performed utilizes a variation of the NP-hard 
Bounded Knapsack problem [6]. In one version, optimization 
could be expressed for a fixed number of users as shown in 
Table V. Take the set of the 11 objects in table IV for eight users 
with event durations of 5, 15, 30, and 45 minutes and 10, 15 or 
20 events per day. The knapsack is the available TUT, which in 
this example is constrained to 12 hours (43,200 sec).  
TABLE V.   TDRS MA FAST FORWARD UTILIZATION AS A BOUNDED 
KNAPSACK OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM 
i Weight (events/day*Av delay) Value (MBytes) 
1 2550  98  
2 3900  148  
3 7520  197  
4 4540  295  
5 8295  443  
6 22100  591  
7 12260  591  
8 44625  886  
9 246420  1,181  
10 33480  886  
11 466395  1,329  
Items {8}, {9}, and {11} are exceed the 43200 sec knapsack 
limiit and are forbidden. The combination of {5, 6, 7} has 
weight of 42655 sec and value of 1624 Mbytes. The goal would 
be to optimize the knapsack up to the capacity. Such a problem 
is regularly approached via dynamic programming and 
evolutionary algorithms. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We have proposed a space-based relay service capable of 
using existing TDRS and WSC assets for a new, novel purpose: 
Spacebased network security restoral data services. It would 
utilize the existing infrastructure of the NASA/GSFC operated 
Space Network and its TDRS relay satellite constellation. The 
combination of a secure facilities at WSC, plus secure, 
encrypted, space links over TDRS, and secure, encrypted, short 
message, one-way acknowledgments facilitates this concept of 
operation. This capability can provide an element of the overall 
strategy for essential network security recovery service in case 
of national cyberattack with other options having been 
compromised.  
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Figure 4. Concept of Operations for Emergency Network Security Restoral 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Simulation scenario with 32 Designated Sites serviced by four TDRS spacecraft. 
 
 
